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Abstract
When an end user attempts to download an app on the Google Play Store they receive
two related items that can be used to assess the potential threats of an application,
the list of permissions used by the application and the textual description of the
application. However, this raises several concerns. First, applications tend to use
more permissions than they need and end users are not tech-savvy enough to fully
understand the security risks. Therefore, it is challenging to assess the threats of an
application fully by only seeing the permissions. On the other hand, most textual
descriptions do not clearly define why they need a particular permission. These two
issues conjoined make it difficult for end users to accurately assess the security threats
of an application. This has lead to a demand for a framework that can accurately
determine if a textual description adequately describes the actual behavior of an
application. In this Master Thesis, we present pDroid (short for privateDroid), a
market-independent framework that can compare an Android application’s textual
description to its internal behavior. We evaluated pDroid using 1562 benign apps
and 243 malware samples, and pDroid correctly classified 91.4% of malware with a
false positive rate of 4.9%.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Chapter 1 discusses the need for a framework that can compare an application’s
alleged behavior to its actual behavior (Section 1.1).

Section 1.2 discusses the

contributions made in this master thesis. Finally, this chapter concludes by describing
the remaining structure of this master thesis.

1.1

Motivation

A growing concern among smartphone users is how third-party applications handle
sensitive data, and a recent survey on smartphone users found that 19 out of the
top 25 user concerns were related to leaking or tampering with user information
[19]. When an end user installs an application from the Google Play Store, they
receive metadata about the application, including the textual description provided
by the developer and the list of permissions used by the application. To protect
their information, they must use the textual descriptions and list of permissions to
assess any security threats properly. However, it has been shown that end users
lack the ability to comprehend the security risks related to Android permissions [22]
and only 9.1% of application descriptions appropriately describe the need for all the
permissions used in the application [52]. These two issues conjoined make it difficult
for end users to assess the security threats of an application, and it has created a desire
1

for a framework that can evaluate if an application description adequately describes
the applications actual behavior.
To address this concern, researchers have developed several frameworks to compare
an app’s textual descriptions to its actual behavior [29, 41, 46, 52, 64]. These
papers mainly have the same goal, but how they describe actual behavior varies.
The work in [46, 52, 64] use the Android permissions an application uses to describe
the actual behavior. The techniques utilized in these papers attempt to evaluate
the textual description and verify if the description states a need for the permissions
requested by the app. One of the concerns with this method is that defining actual
behavior by permissions is a too coarse-grained approach. To create a finer-grained
approach the work in [29, 41] extracted the sensitive APIs used in an application to
define its actual behavior. However, just because an application uses a dangerous
API doesnt necessarily mean it has malicious intent. The framework proposed in
this master thesis, pDroid, attempts to capture an even finer-grained image of an
application’s behavior pDroid uses the dataflows within an application to define the
actual behavior of an application. APIs can only tell us an application accessed
sensitive information. However, dataflows can tell us what sensitive information was
accessed and how an application handled this information. For example, while [29,
41] may consider an app to be suspicious because it uses a sensitive API, such as
LocationManager.getLastLocation(). pDroid will further investigate by checking what
sink received the information. pDroid would most likely consider the behavior of
writing the user’s location to a log file as not suspicious while, on the other hand,
writing the location to a buffer and sending it to a private server would be suspicious.

1.2

Contributions

We created pDroid (short for privateDroid), a market-independent framework that
can compare an Android application’s textual description to its actual internal
behavior. Unlike previous approaches that use permissions or APIs [29, 41, 46, 52,
2

64], pDroid defines an application’s actual behavior by the dataflows extracted using
static-taint analysis. We evaluated pDroid using 1562 benign apps and 243 malware
samples, and pDroid correctly classified 91.4% of malware, with a false positive rate
of 4.9%.

1.3

Structure of Thesis

The remaining chapters cover the background, technical details, and evaluation of
pDroid. Chapter 2 covers several background topics related to pDroid and why we
chose to focus on the Android platform. In Chapter 3 we discuss the technical details
related to clustering applications based on their textual descriptions. Chapter 4
discusses how we identify anomalies based on inconsistencies between the textual
description and the dataflows within an application. Our evaluation results and how
we developed our dataset can be found in Chapter 5. Finally, this masters thesis
concludes in Chapter 6.

3

Chapter 2
Background
2.1

Android

The Android operating system (OS) was unveiled in 2007 and is maintained by the
Open Handset Alliance under the direction of Google. Android is based on the Linux
kernel and is designed primarily for touchscreen devices such as smartphones and
tablets. Currently, Android is the most used mobile OS worldwide and held 80.7%
of the fourth quarter 2015 market shares for mobile operating systems [28]. The
Android OS allows end users to install applications onto their mobile device that
extends the functionality of the device. The most common method for end users
to find applications that meet their needs is to search an application marketplace.
The largest application market is GooglePlay∗ with over two million apps as of
2016 [4]. A centralized approach to distributing applications is efficient for both
developers and end users. It allows developers a fast, efficient, and simple method
to reach millions of potential customers. For an end user, a centralized approach
allows them to search quickly for applications that can meet their personal needs.
While this approach is useful from a distrubution and marketing perspective, it can
be overwhelming for the operator’s of these marketplaces to properly vet the actual
∗

https://play.google.com
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intent of applications uploaded onto the marketplace. Therefore, centralized markets
have created an environment for malware developers to exploit with many potential
victims.

2.1.1

Android Architecture

The Android Architecture is made up of several layers including the application layer,
Android framework, native libraries and Android runtime, hardware abstraction layer,
and the Linux kernel. The layers make up the Android software stack, which is
shown in Figure 2.1. The lowest layer is the Linux kernel and is the foundation
of the Android platform. The Linux kernel handles low-level system services, such
as memory and process management, networking, and controlling hardware drivers.
The kernel also provides Android with several security features such as user-based
permission models and process isolation. The hardware abstraction layer (HAL)
defines a standard interface for hardware vendors to implement and allow Android
to be agnostic about lower-level driver-implementations. The next layer includes
the Android runtime environment which encompasses the Dalvik Virtual Machine
(DVM) and core libraries. Programs for Android are commonly written in Java and
compiled to bytecode for a Java Virtual Machine (JVM), which is then translated into
Dalvik bytecode and stored in a Dalvik Executable (.dex) file allowing for execution
on the DVM. The Dalvik Executable was optimized for minimal memory footprint
allowing it to be ideal for an OS targeted towards devices with constrained processing
power, memory, and storage [17]. Each application running on an Android device is
isolated within its own DVM. The core libraries fall into three categories: Dalvik VMspecific libraries, Java interoperability libraries, and Android libraries. The Dalvik
VM specific libraries are the set of libraries used predominantly for interacting with
the Dalvik VM; the Java interoperability libraries are an open source implementation
of a subset of the standard Java core libraries that have been adapted for use by
applications running in a DVM. The Android libraries are the Java-based libraries

5

Figure 2.1: The Android Stack Software Stack.
*Android. Android Security. Accessed: 5-24-2016. url: https : / / source . android . com /
security/
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that are for Android development (networking, databases, graphics, os, etc.). The
final discussion about this level is the native libraries, which are written in C/C++.
The Android libraries discussed previously are Java-based. However, many of the
APIs called from the Android libraries do not do the majority of the work but are Javabased wrappers around a set of native C/C++ libraries. These C/C++ libraries are
included to fulfill a extensive and diverse range of functions such as SQLite database
management, audio, and Secure Socket Layer (SSL) communication [58]. The next
level of the software stack is the Android framework, which provides interfaces that
form the environment Android applications are running upon; this includes Android
API’s that manage location, activities and content providers. On top of the software
stack are the Android applications. Including all applications, such as home, browse,
and third-party applications.

2.1.2

Android Applications

Android applications are written using the Java programming language. Unlike
conventional Java programs, Android applications do not have a main() function
or a single entry point for execution. Instead, they are designed using components.
App components make up the essential building blocks of an Android app. Each
component is a different point through which the system can enter a developer’s
application. There are four different types of components: activities, services, content
providers, and broadcast receivers. Each type of component serves a different role and
the set of components used in an Android application define its overall behavior. The
activity component creates user interfaces. For example, a messaging application
may have one activity that creates the user interface for allowing a user to input
their message and another activity for allowing the user to view their contacts.
The service component runs in the background to perform tasks. Unlike, activity
components, service components do not have a user interface.

For example, a

service component can be used to play music in the background.
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The content

provider component handles application data. Using content providers, an application
can store data in files, SQLite databases, or other persistent storage locations an
application can access. The broadcast receiver component responds to system-wide
broadcast announcements. For example, the system may broadcast that a picture
has been captured, and the broadcast receiver can alert the application of this action.
In general, broadcast receivers do minimal work, but instead, alert other components
that an event occurred.

2.1.3

Android Security

The Android mobile platform was designed to be truly open. Android applications are
given access to hardware and software, local data and data from servers. This type of
open platform requires a strong security architecture, and Android was developed with
multi-layered security that allows for an open environment while protecting the users
of the platform [1]. The majority of security between Android applications and the
Android system is enforced at the process level using standard Linux facilities, such
as assigning unique user IDs to each Android application. The Linux kernel has been
in widespread use for years and used in millions of security-sensitive environments. It
also has consistently been researched, attacked, and fixed by thousands of developers
allowing it to become a stable and secure kernel. The Linux kernel provides Android
with several security features such as a user-based permission model, process isolation,
and the ability to remove insecure parts of the kernel. The Linux OS is a multiuser
OS and enforces the security policy that a user’s resources and data must be protected
from other users using the system. Android leverages Linux’s user-based protection
scheme by implementing the policy that application resources must be protected from
other applications running on the system. To achieve this at the kernel level, each
application is running as a separate process with its own unique user ID (UID).
Therefore, the code of two different applications cannot run in the same address
space. Access-control is provided through a permission mechanism that enforces

8

restrictions on the operations a particular application can perform. By default, an
Android application has no permissions associated with it, meaning it cannot do
anything adversely impact the user experience or any data on the device [1]. If an
app developer wishes to have access to a user’s sensitive data, they must declare
they are using the permission in the app’s manifest file. For example, an application
that needs to monitor incoming SMS messages would need to request access for the
Android.permission.RECEIVE SMS permission.

2.2

Mobile Malware

Cabir [60] was the first known malware written specifically for smartphones and was
discovered by a cyber security and privacy company, F-Secure,† in June 2004 [32].
Cabir was a proof-of-concept worm that used Bluetooth to propagate itself to new
victims. A novel feature of Cabir was that it did not exploit vulnerabilities found in
the system, and it worked within the security parameters of the Symbian OS. Instead,
it manipulated the user interface to force users of infected phones to propagate the
worm to victims in range. When a potential victim was in Bluetooth range, the
infected phone would incessantly display file-transfer requests on the infected device’s
screen requiring the user to approve or deny the request. If the user chose to deny
the request, Cabir would display another file-transfer request, and once again require
the user to approve or deny the request. To end the constant file-transfer requests,
the user would eventually need to accept the file-transfer, allowing Cabir to infect the
new victim.
While Cabir and modern malware both aspire to manipulate end users into
executing their malicious payload, the mobile ecosystem Cabir exploited pales in
comparison to the current mobile ecosystem. First, the number of users has increased
significantly. In 2005, just 2% of the U.S. population used a smartphone [14], while in
2016 66% of the U.S. population uses smartphones [43]. The growth of mobile malware
†

https://www.f-secure.com/en_US/welcome

9

has also substantially increased. In June of 2005, there were only approximately 60
known mobile malware programs [32]. In 2015, Kaspersky Lab’s detected 2,961,727
malicious mobile packages and 884,774 new malicious mobile programs [61]. Finally,
the modern smartphone have far more computational power and access to private
data compared to the smartphone in 2004.
The modern phone ecosystem contains a variety of mobile operating systems,
but the two primary operating systems are Google’s Android and Apple’s iOS.
Both operating systems allow end users to install third-party applications, but the
procedures used by Apple and Google to regulate untrusted third-party applications
are fundamentally different. For iOS, a third-party application must pass a stringent
human-guided review process, before it is approved to run on iOS devices. Thirdparty developers are required to distribute their application through the official iOS
application marketplace, App Store. If a third-party developer wishes to distribute his
app in the App Store, he must first submit it to Apple for human evaluation, and the
application is only published to the App Store after it has passed the review process.
The technical details of the review process are largely unknown, but according to
the official Apple App Review Guidelines [3], developers should expect their apps to
go through a thorough inspection for all possible term violations. If an application
is approved, it will be signed and published to the App Store. Additionally, Apple
enforces a mandatory code signing mechanism to ensure only applications that have
been approved and signed by Apple are allowed to run on iOS devices, preventing end
users from installing unapproved applications. The implementation details of the code
signing mechanism can be found in [44]. In constrast, the Android mobile platform
was developed to be truly open, and Google takes a more permissive stance on
regulating untrusted third-party applications. The offical Android app marketplace
is Google Play. However, unlike iOS, Android third-party developers are not required
to distribute their application via Google Play and do not need Google’s approval
before distributing their application. This has created several “alternative” and
“unofficial” app marketplaces, and third-party developers can choose to distribute
10

their applications through these markets instead. Third-party app stores are growing
in popularity and provide great convenience to users, especially in countries where
official stores are not available. For example, the largest third-party marketplace is
9Apps‡ , which has 250 million monthly users as of April 2016 and over 26 million
daily app downloads [12]. Finally, Android users have the freedom to download apps
from any source they choose, unlike iOS users who are limited to only downloading
Apple approved applications from the App Store.
While iOS has been criticized for developing an approval process that is opaque,
arbitrary, and limits freedom of expression [31], the review process has to prevent
malicious applications from being published in the App Store.

Despite iOS’s

popularity, only a handful of malicious apps for iOS have been discovered [20], but
like all security methods, the Apple’s review process is not completely secure. Wang
et. al. successfully published the proof-of-concept malware Jekyll [62] into the App
Store. The malicious app was successfully able to perform many malicious tasks, such
as stealthily post tweets, take photos, send email, and exploit kernel vulnerabilities.
The fundamental idea behind Jekyll was to make it remotely exploitable and introduce
malicious control flows by rearranging signed code. Since the malicious control flows
are added after Apple’s approval and did not exist during the review process, Jekyll
stayed undetected.
The vision to make Android truly open by the Open Handset Alliance and Google
has allowed the Android OS to be the most used OS worldwide [28]. Unfortunately,
its lack of regulation has several security drawbacks and has made Android the ideal
target for malware developers. In 2011, Google addressed the problem of Android
malware by introducing Bouncer [38], an automatic dynamic analysis tool used to
scan new and existing Android applications. Unfortunately, the work of Percoco et.
al. [48] found that Bouncer could be easily by-passed by discovering the emulation
environment, such as the IP Address of the emulator, and preventing the malicious
payload from executing during an inspection. In 2015 Google announced they had
‡

http://www.9apps.com/
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added an additional layer of security by having an internal team analyze apps for
policy violations before being published on the Google Play Store, similar to the
approach Apple uses [49]. However, Google’s new layers of security only regulates
the Google Play Store and is unlikely to thwart the trend of Android malware. This
is because the overwhelming majority of Android malware is being developed and
distributed in unregulated third party App Stores in the Middle East and Asia [51],
such as 9Apps. To better understand the security status of Android App Stores,
Cheeta Mobile Security§ surveyed several top alternative app stores, and found that
malware is found at a much higher rate, shown in Table 2.1. Out of the sample of
apps chosen from Google Play, only 48 samples (0.005%). In contrast, out of the
samples from 9Apps, 0.16% apps contained malware.
Unlike the iOS platform, Android user’s have the freedom to download a thirdparty application from unoffical markets.

Third-party app stores bring great

convenience to users, especially in countries where official App Stores are unavailable.
However, the lack of regulations has made the Android platform the ideal target for
malware developers, and the overwhelming majority of mobile malware is found on
Android. Therefore, the remaining discussion in this master thesis will be focused
solely on the Android platform and Android malware.

2.3

Related Work

The components of pDroid touches several research areas such as Android security,
natural language processing (NLP) in software engineering, and app store mining. To
our knowledge, the first proposed framework for comparing the textual description to
an application’s behavior was Whyper [46]. Whyper correlates the description and
permission by extracting natural language keywords from Android API documents.
Since APIs and permissions can be related together [6], the intuition is that
patterns expressed in the API documentation will have a presence in the application
§

http://www.cmcm.com/en-us/
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Table 2.1: Number of samples and malwares in third-party App Stores
App market
9apps
Getjar
Vshare
Aptoide
Mobogenie
Google Play

Number of Sample
32698
1865
14196
37098
23001
904464

Number of malware
53
3
13
20
9
48

Percentage of malware
0.16%
0.16%
0.09%
0.05%
0.04%
0.005%

*Cheeta Mobile. Android App Stores Become Significant Source for Malware. Accessed : 6-8-2016.
2016. url: http://www.cmcm.com/blog/en/security/2016-01-20/925.html
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description, which implies the need for a given permission. If the presence exists, the
application description is transparent and appropriately describes the application’s
behavior; if not, it should raise suspicion.
Three major limitations of Whyper are limited semantic information, lack of
associated APIS, and lack of automation. The limitation of semantic information
is because Whyper uses API documentation to extract semantic patterns. Since
API documentations are related to only describing an API’s functionality, it
cannot obtain subtle correlations between the textual descriptions and the declared
permissions. For example, the work of Qu et. al [52] found that words related to
banking, such as “deposit” and “check” are related to the CAMERA permission,
because banking applications allow end users to deposit checks by snapping a
picture. This type of inference cannot be inferred using only API documentations.
Next, certain sensitive permissions do not have any related APIs [6], such as
RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED. Therefore, it is not possible to extract an semantic
information related from them. Finally, Whyper’s technique is not fully automated
and requires manual extraction of patterns from API documents.
The work of Qu et.

al.

addressed these limitations by proposing Autocog

[52], a fully automated technique for comparing application descriptions to declared permissions. To prevent semantic limitation and lack of associated APIs,
Autocog extracts semantic information from textual descriptions instead of API
documentation.

To provide automation, Autocog leveraged Explicit Semantic

Analysis [27] to extract semantic information from textual descriptions. Autocog
was a significant improvement over Whyper, but it also has its limitations. First,
AutoCog only supports 11 permissions and does not handle critical permissions
that are related to privacy leaks (e.q., phone number, device identifier, service
provider, etc.), sending and receiving text messages, network I/O and critical
system-level behaviors. Additionally, the work of Zhang et. al. discovered that
Autocog sometimes cannot recognize certain words that have substantial security
implications. For example, if “geographic location” is used to describe the permissions
14

ACCESS COARSE LOCATION and ACCESS FINE LOCATION AutoCog cannot
associate this phrase with any permissions.
Both Whyper and Autocog use permissions to define actual behavior. However,
using permissions to define the behavior of an application is a coarse grained approach
that raises several concerns. First, it is often the case that Android applications
request more permissions than they actually use [6, 21, 59]. Next, it has been shown
that end users lack the ability to comprehend the security threats related to Android
permissions [21]. Finally, Qu et. al. found that only 9.1% of textual descriptions
properly describe the need for all of their permissions [52].
Most similar to pDroid is Chabada [29], which compares the textual descriptions to
the actual behavior. Unlike Whyper and AutoCog, Chabada defines actual behavior
as the sensitive APIs found within an application. Using the APIs, Chabada can
provide a clear picture of the application’s actual behavior. The intuition behind
Chabada is that applications with similar textual descriptions should have similar
API usage.

Like pDroid, Chabada clusters applications based on their textual

descriptions. Then it searches for anomalous API usage in application clusters. We see
pDroid as a natural extension to Chabada that provides a more in-depth description
of the application’s actual behavior. The biggest difference between Chabada and
pDroid is that pDroid leverages a more fine-grained approach (dataflows) to define
an application’s behavior. The advantage of this method is that reports of anomalous
behavior can provide a clearer picture of the malicious intent. Additionally, pDroid
leverages binary classification, which labels an application as benign or malicious,
while Chabada uses a one-class SVM for detecting anomalies. In general, binary
classification provides higher accuracy on known malware, while anomaly detection
is better suited for potential zero-day attacks.
In Addition to Chabada, pDroid has similar goals as AAPL [39]. AAPL uses
conditional data flow analysis and joint data flow analysis to find data leakages
in apps. AAPL employees peer voting to distinguish legitimate privacy disclosures
from malicious data leaks. The idea behind peer voting is that applications with
15

similar functionality should exhibit similar privacy disclosures. To obtain peers,
AAPL leverages Google Play’s recommendation system to get peer applications. In
their work, they found Google Play’s recommendation system provided more similar
applications than textual descriptions alone. However, this type of clustering is not
suitable for pDroid. First, we envision pDroid assisting end users in assessing the
security threats related to the permissions and textual descriptions. Second, pDroid
was designed to be market independent, and using the Google Play’s recommendation
system would violate this policy.

16

Chapter 3
Clustering Applications Using
Alleged Behavior
The intuition behind pDroid is that applications with similar alleged behavior (textual
descriptions) should have similar actual behavior (dataflows). In this chapter, we
discuss the technical details and algorithms used to cluster applications with similar
textual descriptions. Section 3.1 presents the detailed preprocessing phase all textual
descriptions go through before being clustered.

In Section 3.2 we discuss how

Latent-Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [11] is used to convert textual descriptions into
document-topic distributions. Finally, Section 3.3 we discuss how pDroid leverages
the document-topic distributions to cluster applications by the semantic similarity
between their textual descriptions using Affinity Propagation [23].

3.1

Preprocessing Application Descriptions

When a developer wants to publish his application, he will upload his application to
the Google Play Store. Along with the application, the developer will also upload
metadata. This metadata includes a textual description, images, the application
name, etc.

In pDroid, we are concerned with the textual description of an
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application, and we consider this the alleged behavior of an application. To allow for
personalization and customization, the Google Play Store has taken a liberal stance
regarding format for application descriptions. While this lenient format is ideal for
creativity, it can cause issues for natural language processing (NLP) tools. Therefore
pDroid first sends all application descriptions through a stringent preprocessing phase
before analysis is completed.
When an unseen app is first introduced to pDroid, its textual description will go
through a sanitizing process. The Google Play Store provides support for many
languages, and the current version of pDroid only provides support for English.
Therefore, pDroid removes any nonEnglish descriptions using Chromium Language
Detector [15], which can detect over 80 different languages.

After this step is

completed, we use Python’s powerful Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) [10] to do
the remaining of our NLP preprocessing. In our first step, we reduce the number of
distinct words in the dataset using case folding, so “The”, “tHE”, and “THE” all
become “the”. Many developers place URLs within their application description to
provide users with the location of external information regarding their application,
company, or personal web page. These URLs are unique and provide little information
about the alleged behavior of an application. Therefore we remove all URLs in a
textual description. Next, we remove any punctuation characters, non-alphabetic
characters, and any non-ASCII values such as ♣, ♠, and c . We then remove any
word that is less than three characters, so any possible artifacts from the previous
sanitizing processes are eliminated. Topic Models are useful for extracting patterns
for meaningful word use, but they are not good at determining which words are
meaningful. It is often the case that the use of very common words such as “the”,
“you”, and “have” do not indicate the type of similarity between documents that we
are interested in [53]. Therefore, we remove all common English stopwords. Words
that are ubiquitous in our dataset such as “app”,“Google”, and“Android” tell us little
about the similarity between application descriptions, therefore pDroid removes the
20 most common words found in the training dataset. Words found in application
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descriptions that are exceedingly rare, such as the application developer’s name, also
provide little information related to the similarity of application descriptions and
we remove any word that does not occur in more than two application descriptions.
Terms such as“charge”, “charged”, and “charging” are similar, and we want them to
be represented by the same word, and pDroid uses a Porter Stemmer [50] for term
normalization.
Any application description that is less than ten words after the preprocessing
phase is removed from the dataset. These application descriptions do not provide
enough context to allow pDroid to infer their alleged behavior.

If pDroid is

being used by an application market management team, it is advised that the
management team requests the developer of the application to provide an application
description of better quality before they approve the application to their marketplace.
Figure 3.1 shows the Pinterest Android application∗ description before sanitization
and Figure 3.2 shows the application description after sanitization.

3.2

Converting Textual Descriptions to Feature
Vectors Using LDA

In Google Play, the developer chooses a category (“Social”, “Music & Audio”,
“Tools”, etc.) to assign their application. The simplest approach for clustering
applications would be to cluster applications based on the category they were assigned
to in the Google Play Store. However, using this method has several shortcomings.
First, previous work that has clustered applications based on textual descriptions has
found that the categories inferred from their analysis did not match the categories
found in the Google Play Store. For example, the application categories found in
the work of Gorla et. al. found that applications that do nothing but display ads
and typically promise the user with some benefit form the “advertisement” category
∗

https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.pinterest
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Pinterest is a visual bookmarking tool that helps you discover and save creative
ideas. Use Pinterest to make meals, plan travel, do home improvement projects
and more. With Pinterest you can:
• Plan a project: Home remodels, garden redesigns and other DIYs
• Get creative ideas: Recipes to cook, articles to read, gifts to buy and ways
to save money
• Explore a hobby: From comic art and camping, to woodworking and weaving
• Save travel inspiration: Outdoor adventures, family fun, road trips and more
• Find your style: Fashion, home decor, grooming tips and beauty inspiration
• Pin from your mobile browser: Save good things you find around the web

Figure 3.1: The Pinterest Android application description prior to sanitization.
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pinterest visual bookmark tool help discov save creativ idea use pinterest make
meal plan travel home improv project pinterest plan project home remodel garden
redesign diy get creativ idea recip cook articl read gift buy way save money explor
hobbi comic art camp woodwork weav save travel inspir outdoor adventur famili
fun road trip find style fashion home decor groom tip beauti inspir pin mobil
browser save good thing find around web

Figure 3.2: The Pinterest Android application description after sanitization.

21

which is not an actual category in Google Play [29]. Second, several of the Google Play
categories are simply too broad and contain applications with stark differences with
respect to their functionality. For example, alarm clock apps, keyboard apps, and
flashlight apps can all be found in the tools category of Google Play. Next, Android
applications are multifaceted and cannot be described by only one category. The
popular Android application Twitter† is found in the social category on Google Play.
However, it also provides the end user with the capability of sending direct messages
to other Twitter users, which is a trait of applications found in the communication
category of Google Play. Finally, using the categories on the Google Play marketplace
violates the goal of making pDroid market independent.
To achieve market independence and give pDroid the capability to infer the
many facets of an Android application, pDroid creates application categories using
the well-known topic model, Latent-Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) [11]. Topic models
are statistical models that can discover the semantic topics pervading a document
set. After a topic model identifies the semantic topics, it can quantify the semantic
differences between documents, allowing it to organize the otherwise unlabeled and
unorganized dataset. The intuition behind LDA is that documents (application
descriptions) exhibit traits from multiple topics (application categories).

This

intuition can be seen visually in the Android application description Instagram ‡ shown
in Figure 3.3. In the description words related to Communication are highlighted
in blue, words related to Photos and Videos, are highlighted in green, and the words
highlighted in yellow are related to Social Media. If we took the time to label all words,
a document-topic distrubution could be created showing how related a document is
to a topic.
To capture this intuition, LDA assumes that documents in the collection arose
from a set of topics, where a topic is defined as a distribution over words. To create
topics, LDA uses a sampling algorithm such as Gibbs sampling [34] to find words
†
‡

https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.twitter.android
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.Instagram.android
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Share your photos and videos , and keep up with your friends and interests. Instagram is a simple way to
capture and share the worlds moments. Follow your friends and family to see what theyre up to, and
discover

accounts from all over the world that are sharing things you love. Join the community of over 400

million people and express yourself by sharing photos and videos from your daywhether its your morning
routine or the trip of a lifetime.
Use Instagram to:
•

Edit and share

photos and videos with filters and creative

tools to change photo

brightness ,

contrast and saturation , as well as shadows , highlights , perspective and more.
• Discover photos and videos you might like and follow new accounts in the Explore tab.
• Send private messages ,
Instagram Direct.

photos ,

videos and posts from your feed directly to friends with

• Instantly share photos and videos on Facebook , Twitter , Tumblr and other social networks.

Figure 3.3: Application Description for the Android Application Instagram.

23

that frequently co-occur. Words that co-occur are assumed to be similar and will
be assigned to the same topic. For example, after analyzing a set of application
descriptions related to Weather, LDA created a topic containing the (stemmed) words
“weather”, “forecast,” “temperatur”, and “satellit.” After analyzing applications
related to Travel, LDA created a topic containing the words “flight”, “visit”, and
“map.” More words found in the Weather and Travel category can be found in Figure
3.4. Since LDA assumes that the documents in the collection arose from these topics,
it can create a document-topic distribution, stating how likely a document originated
from this topic, hence how similar it is to a topic.
pDroid uses the Mallet machine learning for language toolkit [42] to implement
LDA. Mallet provides a Java-based implementation of LDA that uses an extremely
fast and highly scalable implementation of Gibbs sampling and provides an efficient
method for document-topic hyperparameter optimization. Following previous work,
we train LDA using 30 topics [29]. Using thirty topics is based on the fact that
Google Play uses 30 topics to categorize their applications, and it is possible that a
more optimal amount of topics exist. Table 3.1 shows the top words in each topic after
we trained LDA on application descriptions. After training, LDA can be used to infer
the document-topic distributions for unseen application descriptions. When pDroid
is given an unseen application description, it will first preprocess the description; then
it will create a document-topic distribution using LDA.
The output of LDA does not provide a binary decision that a document belongs to
a particular topic or does not belong in a topic. Instead, it provides a document-topic
distribution, which is the probability that a document arose from a particular topic.
An example of the document-topic distributions for the social media app for photo
sharing Instagram and the racing game, Mountain Climb Race 2 § are shown in Figure
3.5
§

https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.awesomecargames.
mountainclimbrace2
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(a) Travel

(b) Weather

Figure 3.4: Weather and Travel Topics Found By LDA
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Table 3.1: Top words in each category.
Topic
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Topic Name
Language
Holidays and Religion
Cooking and Food
Fitness and Diet
Fashion
Casino Games
Fantasy Games
Puzzle Games
Broadcasting
Racing Games
Reading
Photos and Videos
Weather
Communication
Action Games
Finance
Themes
File and System
Music
Children
Anime
Ringtones
Legal
Inspirational
Information
Sports
Social Media
Utilities
Browsing
Data

Top Stemmed Terms In Each Application Cluster.
languag word learn english german translat spanish french dictionari chines
christma year holidai santa christian celebr gift polic islam tree
recip beer cake chicken appl cook chocol bake salad creams
weight bodi diet exercis workout food lose yoga train
girl beauti pictur sexi fashion cheerlead design hair high nail
slot machin card poker player coin casino spin bonu high
stori halloween world magic monster build adventur citi collect
puzzl level bubbl mode match challeng score classic player
radio flag station countri channel world stream broadcast internet listen
race ball speed level jump control score challeng world mode
book question quiz answer read aikido logo test bibl reader
photo imag color share pictur facebook save friend effect
weather locat citi travel inform guid forecast rout attract find
version email googl user work contact permiss send internet requir
weapon zombi enemi battl fight power world action shoot attack
calcul track manag data account market rate expens currenc list
theme launcher instal gold appli choos menu icon locker getjar
file player mobil control manag connect media wifi network secur
music song album artist movi danc lyric youtub style record
anim babi children learn fish memori child balloon sound mode
seri comic manga anim releas dragon charact film naruto imag
sound rington music alarm notif record sleep relax song
copyright page guid trademark cheat link owner develop unoffici trick
love make friend good find life great peopl give feel
inform includ system provid medic product develop gener design refer
team footbal leagu player sport score basketbal soccer match club
facebook twitter updat mobil share latest access find search friend
widget batteri button option chang menu notif click displai model
search galaxi samsung home icon delet creat notif easili shortcut
home step press polici data background notif menu term privaci
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Instagram was assigned to the following four topics:
• Topic 11 (Photos) with a probability of 60.2%.
• Topic 26 (Social Media) with a probability of 26.2%.
• Topic 9 (Racing Games) with a probability of 8.49%.
• Topic 24 (Information) witha probability of 4.80%.

Mountain Climb Race 2 was assigned to the following four topics:
• Topic 9 (Racing Games) with a probability of 90.4%.
• Topic 14 (Action Games) with a probability of 2.47%.
• Topic 23 (Inspirational) with a probability of 2.33%.
• Topic 7 (Puzzle Games) with a probability of .67%.

Figure 3.5: Topic Distrubutions for Instagram and Mountain Climb Race 2.
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Originally, the final stage of clustering applications by alleged behavior was
assigning an application to the four topics it was most highly distributed over.
Therefore Instagram would be assigned to the “Photos”, “Social Media”, “Racing
Games”, and “Information” categories and Mountain Climb Race 2 would be
allocated to the categories “Racing Games”, “Action Games”, “Inspiration”, and
“Puzzle Games.” The weakness of this approach was that it did not take into
consideration the topic proportions for each application. Therefore, an application
such as Instagram is given the same equality of determining the overall behavior as
an application such as Mountain Climb Race 2 in the “Racing Games” category.
The similarity between racing games and Instagram is difficult to understand.
Game developers often describe the quality of the graphics found in their application
in the description. Since graphics share a similarity between images and photos, LDA
gives Instagram a slight distribution over the “Racing Games” category. To mitigate
the issue of LDA inferring unwanted semantic similarities an additional clustering
stage is implemented in pDroid which is discussed in Section 3.3.

3.3

Clustering Apps With Affinity Propagation

LDA does not assign an application description to one particular topic. Instead, it
quantifies the semantic structure of the description by providing a document-topic
distribution. A simple clustering approach would be to assign an application to
its most related topic. However, many Android applications are multi-faceted and
have traits rising from a variety of topics, so this approach would not capture the
entire behavior of the application. Another possible approach would be to require
an application description’s proportion over a topic to meet a threshold before it
is assigned to that cluster, but the ideal limit would be difficult to find and would
be different for each cluster. Therefore, to cluster applications, pDroid uses Affinity
Propagation (AP) [23], using the document-topic distributions as feature vectors.
Unlike k-means, AP does not require the number of clusters to be determined before
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running the algorithm. Instead, AP finds “exemplars” which are members of the
dataset that are representative of clusters [23]. Affinity Propagation creates clusters
by sending messages between pairs of samples until convergence. The messages sent
between two points belong to one of two categories, the responsibility r(i, k) or the
availability a(i, k). The responsibility is defined as the accumulated evidence that
sample k should be the exemplar for sample i. The availability is the accumulated
evidence that sample i should choose sample k to be its exemplar and takes into
consideration the values for all other samples that k should be an exemplar. Therefore,
exemplars are selected by samples if they are similar enough to many samples and
chosen by many samples to be representative of themselves. To implement Affinity
Propagation we use Python’s Scikit-Learn: Machine Learning in Python Toolkit [47].
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Chapter 4
Identifying Anomalous Behavior
After creating application clusters, the next goal of pDroid is to identify which
applications are using anomalous dataflows within each cluster. In this chapter, we
discuss how pDroid identifies abnormal actual behavior in each application cluster.
Section 4.1 describes how pDroid extracts dataflows using FlowDroid [5]. Section 4.2
discusses Android dataflows, and Section 4.3 discusses the possible ways pDroid can
represent dataflows. In Section 4.4 we discuss how pDroid quantifies the sensitivity of
individual dataflows. Section 4.5 discusses how pDroid leverages application clusters
and sensitivity scores to create an anomaly score for applications. Finally, we discuss
how pDroid classifies an application as benign or malicious in Section 4.6.

4.1

Extracting Dataflows from Android Applications

To extract the permissions used by an Android application, one can just parse the
application’s manifest file. Obtaining the sensitive APIs from an application is also a
relatively simple task, and can be completed using popular reverse engineering tools,
such as apktool [63]. Unfortunately, extracting the dataflows found within an Android
application is not as simple and requires dataflow analysis. pDroid uses static taint
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analysis to obtain sensitive dataflows within an application. In taint analysis, sensitive
information is first identified as a taint source, and data originating from a taint source
is considered tainted. The tainted data is then tracked until it leaves the system
through a tainted sink. Taint analysis can be completed statically or dynamically. In
static taint analysis, the code (source, intermediate, or binary) is observed and reports
any dataflows that may occur during the execution of the program. In dynamic taint
analysis, the program is executed and reports the dataflows that occurred during
runtime. In the static approach, an exhaustive search can be used to indicate all
possible dataflows found within the code. Static analysis provides a complete picture
of information flows found within applications. However, static analysis can report
dataflows that are infeasible during execution time, leading to false positives. In
contrast, during dynamic taint analysis, all dataflows reported are accurate, because
they occurred during the runtime of the application. However, the results of dynamic
analysis are bound to the test cases used to stimulate the application. In pDroid, we
use the state-of-the-art static taint analysis tool, FlowDroid [5].
FlowDroid is a context-, flow-, field-, object-sensitive and lifecycle-aware static
taint analysis tool for Android applications. Since Android applications do not have
a standard main() entry point, FlowDroid creates a dummy main() method from the
list of entry points found within the application. Next, FlowDroid uses the generated
main method to create a call graph and inter-procedural control-flow graph (ICFG).
FlowDroid then detects all sources of information that are reachable from the entry
points. From these sources, FlowDroid applies taint analysis tracking by traversing
the ICFG and reports all discovered flows from sources to sinks [24].
In order to achieve precise taint analysis, Flowdroid must take into consideration
flow-sensitivity, field-sensitivity, object-sensitivity, and context-sensitivity. A taintanalysis technique is considered flow-sensitive if it takes into consideration the order
of statements. In Figure 4.4.A, flow-sensitivity is required to identify that the sink on
line 2 does not access the information coming from the source on line 3. In contrast,
if the taint analysis technique were flow-insensitive, it would assume the source of
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information on line 3 enters the sink on line 2, leading to a false positive. Contextsensitive taint analysis is required to track objects returned by method calls which
are invoked with different input parameters. In Figure 4.4.B, context-sensitivity is
necessary to distinguish that the sensitive information accessed on line 2 does not
end up in the sink on line 3. Object-sensitivity is similar to context-sensitivity, and
it takes into consideration the allocation site of the object to differentiate call sites.
In Figure 4.4.C, object-sensitivity is required to distinguish that the sink on line 5
does not receive the information from the source argument in line 3. Finally, fieldinsensitive approaches merge taint information to the base object, while field-sensitive
techniques treat all fields of a base object separately.
Applying static taint analysis on large Android applications comes with challenges.
The major area of conflict described by Hammer et. al. is on one hand, the analysis
should be correct and report all data leaks with few false negatives, but should be
able to analyze real-world applications in a realistic amount of time [30]. To find
an optimal trade-off between accuracy and runtime, we follow the work of [7], and
configure FlowDroid with the following configurations:
• No Flow Across Intents: Android components communicate through a messaging object called
an Intent. The most common use of Intents are to start an activity, start a service, or to
deliver a broadcast. pDroid does not track dataflows through intents. Instead, all dataflows
ending in intents are assigned the SUSI category, INTENT.
• Explicit flows only: FlowDroid currently focuses on explicit dataflows, and implicit flows
caused by control-flow dependencies are ignored [25].
• aliasflowins. This option makes FlowDroid flow-insensitive, which improves the runtime for
larger applications, but it may generate false positives.
• aplength set to 3. This sets the maximum access path length to 3, instead of the default of 5.
Large access paths make analysis more precise but makes it more expensive.
• No static fields - This prevents tracking of static fields. This makes analysis faster, but it
may miss potential data leaks.
• No Layout Mode - Input from Android GUI components are not taken into consideration as
sources for dataflows.
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1
2
3

int x = 1;
sink ( x );
x = source ();

4.4.A
4
5
6
7
8

void contextExample (){
String x = foo ( " abc " )
String y = foo ( source ());
sink ( x );
}

9
10
11
12

String foo ( String s ){
return s ;
}

4.4.B
4
5
6

void objectExample (){
Foo x = new Foo ( " bar " );
Foo y = new Foo ( source ());

7

sink ( x . getValue ());

8
9

}

10
11
12

class Foo {
String s ;

13

public foo ( String inputString ){
s = inputString
}

14
15
16
17

public String getValue (){
return s ;
}

18
19
20
21

}

4.4.C

Figure 4.4: (A) A flow-sensitive example. (B) A context-sensitive example. (C) A
object-sensitive example.
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With these configurations, we embed FlowDroid within pDroid to extract
dataflows. After the dataflows are extracted, pDroid uses them to apply further
analysis. We treat FlowDroid as a black box, and a more detailed description of its
internal mechanisms can be found in the following literature, [5, 24, 25].

4.2

Dataflows in Android Applications

pDroid defines the actual behavior of an application by the set of dataflows
found within the application.

Applications running on an Android system are

sandboxed, and applications can interact with the underlying system through an
API interface provided by the Android platform. APIs that provide the application
with resources are considered sources of data. APIs that export information from
the application are called sinks. A dataflow is a tuple containing the signature
of the source method and the signature of the sink method.

For example, the

API LocationManager.getLastLocation() returns the users last known location and is
considered a source, and the API URL.openConnection(), which opens a connection
to the referred URL is a sink.
While FlowDroid can provide taint tracking, it does not know which APIs in
the Android interface are sources and sinks. Instead, the user must provide a list
of sources and sinks as input. Creating a comprehensive list of sources and sinks
for the Android platform is a challenging task due to the existing amount of APIs.
For example, Androids version 4.2, contains 110,000 public methods, which makes
manual classifications of sources and sinks infeasible [55]. One possible solution is
permission maps [6, 8, 21], which identifies APIs in the Android interface that require
a permission, and only considers those APIs as sensitive sources or sinks. However,
this method only includes the subset of APIs that are protected by permissions, and
the work of Rasthofer et. al. found that many sources or sinks did not require
a permission [55].

For example, the getNetworkOperatorName() method in the

TelephonyManager class returns the name of the network operator or carrier, but
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does not require a permission. In pDroid, we use SUSI a fully automated machinelearning approach for identifying sources and sinks directly from Android source code
[55]. SUSI does not consider only protected APIs but instead considers all APIs
when discovering sources and sinks. SUSI is also fully automated, allowing the list
of sources and sinks discovered by it to be updated when a new version of Android
is released. SUSI also categorizes sources and sinks into human readable categories
such as Location, Bluetooth, and Database. Finally, the list of SUSI categories was
extended in the work of Avdiienko et. al. to include three new categories, intents,
nonsensitive sink, and nonsensitive source. A list of all SUSI categories can be found
in Table 4.1.

4.3

Representing Actual Behavior

FlowDroid provides pDroid with raw dataflows, which contains the full method
signature for both the source and sink that created the dataflow. A method signature
in Java contains the method name and the number and types of its parameters.
Similar to [7], pDroid is configured to work on the following levels of granularity:
• Method This level of granularity is the finest, and uses the full method signature to define
a source or sink. For example, SmsManager.sendTextMessage(...)
• SUSI Category, The most coarse grain method for representing a source or sink, would be
to represent it by the SUSI category it was assigned to, such as SMS MMS

In addition to this type of granularity, all nonsensitive sources and sinks, such as
the device’s display, are represented by the SUSI category, No Sensitive Source and
No Sensitive Sink. We provide an example of representing the actual behavior at
each level of granuality for the mobile application EZ Clock & Weather Widget ∗ in
Figure 4.5.
∗

https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=mobi.infolife.cwwidget&hl=en
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Table 4.1: SUSI Source and Sink categorie
Sources
HARDWARE INFO
UNIQUE IDENTIFIER
LOCATION INFORMATION
NETWORK INFORMATION
ACCOUNT INFORMATION
EMAIL INFORMATION
FILE INFORMATION
BLUETOOTH INFORMATION
VOIP INFORMATION
DATABASE INFORMATION
PHONE INFORMATION
CONTENT RESOLVER
NO SENSITIVE SOURCE

Sinks
PHONE CONNECTION
VOIP
PHONE STATE
EMAIL
BLUETOOTH
ACCOUNT SETTINGS
SYNCHRONIZATION DATA
NETWORK
EMAIL SETTINGS
FILE
LOG
INTENT
NO SENSITIVE SINK
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Shared
AUDIO
SMS MMS
CONTACT INFORMATION
CALENDAR INFORMATION
SYSTEM SETTINGS
IMAGE
BROWSER INFORMATION
NFC

Method Granularity
NO SENSITIVE SOURCE
Activity.setResult(int, content.Intent)
LocationManager.getLastKnownLocation(String)
Log.i(String, String)
LocationManager.getLatitude()
Log.i(String, String)
LocationManager.getLongitude()
Log.i(String, String)
SUSI Granularity
NO SENSITIVE SOURCE
INTENT
LOCATION INFORMATION
LOG
LOCATION INFORMATION
LOG
LOCATION INFORMATION
LOG
Figure 4.5: Dataflows in “EZ Clock & Weather Widget” using method, class, and
SUSI granularity.
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4.4

Creating Sensitivity Scores For Dataflows

pDroid uses all dataflows found within an application to define the behavior of an
application. However, dataflows within an application are not equally as sensitive.
For example, the source TelephonyManager.getDeviceId() returns the IMEI† , if this
information is sent to an unknown web server using the sink URL.openconnection()
it is certainly a more sensitive dataflow then only writing the IMEI to a log file using
the sink, Log.i(). Additionally, since the actual behavior varies between application
clusters, the sensitivity of a dataflow should also depend on the application behavior
found in a given cluster.

To assign weights, we use an approah similar to the

inverse-document frequency (idf) statistic found in term-frequency inverse-documentfrequency (tf-idf) [57]; a well known statistic for detecting how important a word is
to a document in the field of Information Retrieval. The inverse-document frequency
reflects how important a word is to a document in a collection or corpus. Instead of
considering words within a document we are considering how important a dataflow
is to an application cluster. If many applications within an application cluster are
using a particular dataflow, the dataflow should be considered less sensitive, and if
the dataflow is uncommon in the cluster it should be considered a sensitive dataflow.
To calculate the sensitivity weight for a dataflow, pDroid uses equation 4.1, where
N is the amount of applications in application cluster c and ad is the amount of
applications in that cluster that use dataflow d.

Wc,d =

4.5

N
ad

(4.1)

Creating Anomaly Scores

The next goal of pDroid is to identify applications that have actual anomalous
behavior. In pDroid, we consider an application to be exhibiting abnormal behavior
†

International Mobile Station Equipment Identity
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when it is using dataflows or combinations of dataflows that are uncommon in the
application cluster it was assigned. Applications exhibiting anomalous behavior are
considered outliers, and pDroid leverages outlier detection to identify applications
that have unusual behavior. Specifically, pDroid uses Orca, a tool for detecting
outliers based on their distance from their closest neighbors [9].

Orca uses the

distance from a sample to its nearest neighbors to determine its similarity. The
intuition is that if samples are close to other samples in the feature space, then the
sample is most likely not an outlier. If an application is using dataflows that are
extremely different from its nearest neighbors (most similar applications), then it
probably exhibits unusual behavior and should raise suspicion. When using distancebased techniques for outlier detection, a distance metric must be defined. pDroid
uses weighted Euclidean distance, shown in Eq. 4.2. Given a distance measure on a
feature space, there are many different definitions of distance-based outliers [9]. Three
popular definitions are:
1. Outliers are the example for which there are fewer than p other examples within distance d
[35, 36]
2. Outliers are the top n examples whose distance to the kth neighbor is greatest [54]
3. Outliers are the top n examples whoses average distance to the k nearest neighbor is greatest
[2, 18]

Similar to the reasoning in [37], the first definition of an outlier requires a
maximum neighborhood, and does not provide an anomaly score for all applications.
The second definition does not take into consideration the local density of samples.
Therefore, we use the third definition to define an outlier in pDroid, where outliers
are considered the n examples whose average distance to the k nearest neighbor is
greatest. This definition provides pDroid with the most flexibility, allowing it to
discover anomalies on a per-cluster basis.

dx,b

n
X
=
(wi (xi − bi )2 )1/2 )
i=1

39

(4.2)

To use Orca, we convert the raw dataflows to feature vectors representing the
dataflows an application uses. Since there are many ways to represent dataflows,
there is also many ways to construct feature vectors for Orca to use. First, we
take into consideration the granularity desired for analysis. pDroid is configured to
provide anomaly scores using the two granularities discussed in Section 4.3. We found
that method granularity was most suitable for providing anomaly scores. Next, an
application may use a particular dataflow many times. We evaluated two different
methods for representing the quantity of a dataflow. The first method took into
consideration the number of occasions a dataflow was found within an application.
Therefore, if dataflow d is found in application a v times, then ad = v. The second
approach is binary approach, and creates a feature vector based on if a dataflow was
found within an application. If the application used dataflow d, then ad = 1, if it
did not then ad = 0. Through our evaluation, we found that the binary approach
outperformed the full approach. Therefore, for each application, pDroid creates a
feature vector ~a. If an application used a dataflow, di , then ai is set to 1, and ai is
set to 0 if the application does not contain di . Since pDroid uses weighted Euclidean
distance, pDroid must also create a weight vector, w,
~ for each application, where
wi represents the importance of di in the overall distance calculation. To create
an application’s weight vector, we use the per-cluster sensitivity scores discussed in
Section 4.4. If an application is assigned to the application cluster c, then wi = Wc,di .
Additionally, we did not want to punish an application for not using a dataflow that
one of its neighbors used. Therefore, if di is not found in an application, wi = 0.
To create an anomaly score for an unknown app, a, that was assigned to
application cluster c, pDroid runs Orca with k set to 5 and uses other applications
assigned to c as the reference set (potential neighbors). The output of Orca will be
an anomaly score representing the average distance from its five nearest neighbors.
In Table 4.2 we provide the anomaly scores for an application cluster and malicous
applications are highlighted in red.
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Table 4.2: Anomaly Scores for an Application Cluster
air.com.mobigrow.canyouescape.apk

0.869

B

biz.mtoy.blockpuzzle.revolution.apk

7.23

B

com.PinballGame.apk

0.403

B

com.adwo.android.snake.apk0

79.725

M

com.bankey.candy.apk

14.703

B

com.bigduckgames.flow.apk

5.329

B

com.bitlogik.uconnect.apk0

34.555

M

com.bottleShootingGames.apk

6.719

B

com.camelgames.abnormalup.apk

38.54

M

com.cdroid.darts.apk

26.238

B

com.chenyx.tiltmazs.apk0

45.134

M

com.djinnworks.StickCliffDiving.lite.apk

1.765

B

com.game.BubbleShooter.apk

0.56

B

com.game.basketballshoot.apk

0.56

B

com.gp.jewels.apk1

54.284

M

com.hapogames.BubbleFarm.apk

0.909

B

com.icegame.fruitlink.apk

8.748

B

com.kiwifruitmobile.sudoku.apk

17.669

B

com.leagem.chesslive.apk

2.332

B

com.leagem.mahjong.apk

0.564

B

com.leftover.CoinDozer.apk

11.595

B

com.masshabit.squibble.free.apk0

44.33

M

com.mogo.threesameline.apk1

76.947

M

com.natenai.glowhockey2.apk

0.0

B

com.nix.game.mahjong.apk

2.949

B

com.oe.crazycorns.apk0

20.774

M

com.ps.yams.apk

71.856

M

com.threed.bowling.apk

6.097

B

com.wooga.diamonddash.apk

20.961

B
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If an application receives a high anomaly score, pDroid can provide additional information about how each dataflow contributed to the overall anomaly
score. For example, we used pDroid to inspect the malicious Android application,
com.camelgames.abnormal.apk that belongs to the BeanBot Malware Family [33].
Table 4.3 shows the per-dataflow anomaly scores for each dataflow. The bolded
dataflows represent the malicous payload that is transporting sensitive information to
the app’s command and control server. Since these dataflows are uncommon in other
applications within the cluster, pDroid assigns these dataflows a high anomaly score.
Additionally, this malware sample has the ability to stealthily send text messages in
the background [33], which pDroid also detects.

4.6

Running pDroid as a Malware Classifier

Now that we have created anomaly scores for all applications, the final stage of
pDroid uses supervised learning to classify applications as benign or malicious based
on their anomaly scores. In addition to the anomaly scores, we found that applications
with many dataflows naturally recieved higher anomaly scores. To address this issue
we added an additional feature, the amount of unique dataflows found within an
application. pDroid leverages the well known classification tool, Support Vector
Machine (SVM) [13], to classify applications. Support Vector Machines are based
on the concept of decision planes that define decision boundaries, where a decision
plane is one that separates a set of objects that belong to different classes. To train our
SVM, pDroid normalizes anomaly scores in each application cluster and aggegrates all
applications to create a training set. The goal of traininig a Support Vector Machine
is to find the separating hyperplane with the largest margin; the larger the margin,
the better generalization of the classifier [16]. The basic intuition behind SVMs is to
map the original input space into a feature space using a kernel, so that in the new
feature space the data will be linearly separable. There are many types of kernels
that can be used in SVM models, including linear, polynomial, radial basis function
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Table 4.3: Anomaly Scores for each dataflow in com.camelgames.abnormalup.apk.
Dataflow
NO SENSITIVE SOURCE
ContextWrapper.openFileOutput()
NO SENSITIVE SOURCE
Log.w()
ContentResolver.query()
NO SENSITIVE SINK
ContentResolver.query()
URL.openConnection()
ConnectivityManager.getNetworkInfo()
NO SENSITIVE SINK
NetworkInfo.getExtraInfo()
NO SENSITIVE SINK
TelephonyManager.getDeviceId()
URL.openConnection()
TelephonyManager.getLine1Number()
URL.openConnection()
TelephonyManager.getSimSerialNumber()
URL.openConnection()
TelephonyManager.getSubscriberId()
NO SENSITIVE SINK
SmsManager.getDefault()
SmsManager.sendTextMessage()
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Anomaly Score
0.429
0.182
0.429
5.0
0.5
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
2.0
5.0

(RBF), and sigmoid. The most commonly used kernel, and the one used in pDroid
is the RBF kernel.
When training a SVM with a Gaussian Kernel, two parameters must be
considered, the regularization parameter C and the kernel hyperparameter γ. The
parameter C, controls the trade off between misclassificaiton and the simplicity of the
decision surface. A low C value makes the decision smooth, while a high C aims at
classifying training examples correctly. The γ parameter defines how far the influence
of a single training example reaches. The larger gamma is, the closer other examples
must be to be affected. Proper C and γ values are critical to an SVM’s performance,
and we leveraged Python Scikit-learn library’s implementation of Grid Search to find
the optimal paramaters.
Grid Search is a traditional hyperparameter optimization techniques that is simply
an exhaustive sweep over a set of manually set of potential values. To perform grid
search, one chooses a finite amount of reasonble values for the hyperparameters. In
our case, we let C be equal to values of 1, 10, 100, and 1000 and γ to be values from
.0001, .001, .01, and .01. Then we used grid search to train an SVM with each pair
of (C, γ). Through our evaluation, we found that a C value of 100 and a γ value of
.01 provided optimal results.
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Chapter 5
Evaluation
In this chapter, we discuss the data collection, evaluation, and limitations of pDroid.
Section 5.1 explains how we collected the dataset for evaluating pDroid. Next, in
Section 5.2 we evaluated pDroid’s ability to detect malware. In Section 5.3 we discuss
how clustering applications improved performance. In Section 5.4 we evaluate our
method for creating sensitivity scores increase, and Section 5.4 compares the different
levels of granularity for dataflows. Also, this chapter also discusses the limitations of
pDroid in Section 5.6.

5.1

Data Collection

To test pDroid, we leverage the dataset used to evaluate MudFlow [7]. This dataset
contains the dataflows discovered from FlowDroid in 2,866 of the most popular
Android apps from the Google Play Store, and dataflows found within 15,338 malware
apps. The malware set came from two sources, VirusShare [56] and the Android
Genome Project [65]. For simplicity, we will call this dataset, the MudFlow Dataset.
Initially, this dataset lacked the necessary metadata for our analysis, such as the
textual description. We used two approaches for obtaining the textual descriptions.
First, we crawled the Google Play Store to check if the application still existed on
the store. If this was the case, we saved the textual descriptions. If the application
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was no longer on the Google Play Store, we checked if the application’s description
existed in the dataset used to evaluate Chabada [29], which we will call the Chabada
Dataset. While we were not able to obtain textual descriptions for all 2,866 benign
apps in the MudFlow Dataset, we were able to receive descriptions for 1562 benign
apps.
It is often the case that malware repositories, such as VirusShare and the Android
Genome Project only contain the .apk file for each sample and lack any metadata
about the application. This makes obtaining malware metadata a more complicated
process.

To get malware, we first compared the malware samples found in the

MudFlow and Chabada dataset for matches. This provided us with 118 malware
samples containing both the textual description and the dataflows. To increase
our dataset, we leveraged a similar technique found in [29]. Many of the samples
found within the Android Genome Project are repackaged versions of benign apps.
These applications provide the same functionality as the original application but
have the malicious payload injected into them. Therefore, we installed the malware
onto an Android emulator to evaluate the expected behavior of the application; then
we searched the Google Play Store for an application that would provide similar
functionality and used its textual description to represent the malicious app’s alleged
behavior. Using this method, we were able to obtain 243 malware samples in overall.

We evaluated pDroid using 1562 benign apps and 243 malware samples.

5.2

PDroid for Malware Detection

Our first goal is to evaluate how effective pDroid can correctly classify applications
as benign or malicous. To evaluate our system, we use standard machine learning
evaulation approaches [16]. We define a true positive, true negative, false positive,
and false negative as the followiing:
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• True Positive (TP) - pDroid correctly classifiers a malicious app as malware.
• True Negative (TN) - pDroid correctly classifies a benign application as
benign.
• False Positive (FP) - pDroid missclassifies a benign application as malicous.
• False Negative (FN) - pDroid missclasssifies a malicous application as benign.
To evaluate pDroid’s ability to detect malware, we take into consideration the
True Positive Rate (TPR), True Negative Rate (TNR), and Accuracy. Since our
dataset is extremely unbalanced (contains more benign samples then malware) the
standard method for calculating accuracy, shown in Eq. 5.1, would not be ideal.
Instead, we use the geometric accuracy, shown in Eq. 5.2. To evaluate our system, we
use stratified 10-fold cross validation. In k-fold cross-validation, the original dataset
is randomly partitioned into k equal size partitions (“folds”). One fold is held out
and is considered the testing set. The other k − 1 partitions are used for training the
classifier. This approach is repeated k times, where each time a different partition
is held out for testing. Stratified k-fold cross-validation extends this approach by
preserving the percentage of samples for each class in each fold [47]. Therefore, we
run pDroid ten times, each time with a different set of training and testing samples.
For each run, we report the TPR, TNR, and geometric accuracy. The results for each
run can be found in Table 5.1. pDroid’s geometric acccuracy was 93.5 % with a false
positive rate of 4.9%.

pDroid correctly classified 91.4% of malware, with a false positive rate of 4.9%.

TP + TN
TP + FN + TN + FP
√
g = TP × TN

accuracy =
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(5.1)
(5.2)

Table 5.1: Cross Validation Results for pDroid.
run
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
Avg

TNR (%)
96
96
94
94
96
95
95
94
97
94
95.1

TPR (%)
91
92
94
90
93
92
92
92
92
91
91.4
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Geometric Accuracy (%)
93.5
94.0
94.0
92.0
94.5
93.5
93.5
93.0
94.5
92.5
93.5

Table 5.2: Comparison of Clustering Techniques.
Clustering Technique
Affinity Propagation
K Means (30 clusters)
No Clustering

TNR (%)
95.1
93.2
88.0

TPR (%)
91.9
91.0
90

Geometric Accuracy (%)
93.5
92.45
89

Table 5.3: Evaluation of Sensitivity Scores.
Sensitivity
Sensitivity Scores
No Sensitivity Scores

5.3

TNR (%)
95.1
90.1

TPR (%)
91.5
91.0

Geometric Accuracy (%)
93.1
90.2

Evaluating the use of application clusters

Next we wanted to evaluate what improvements were provided by clustering
applications before creating anomaly scores. we evaluated the performance of pDroid
using no clusters, k-means clustering, and affinity propagation. Table 5.2 shows the
results for each technique. We found that application clustering improved the false
positive rate by 7.1%.

Application clustering reduces the false positive rate by 7.1%.

5.4

Evaluating Dataflow Sensitivity Scores

For each dataflow, pDroid assigned a sensitivity score that quantifies the sensitivity
of a given dataflow. To evaluate how useful sensitivity score we ran pDroid assuming
all dataflows were equally as sensitive, and the results are shown in Table 5.3. We
found that using sensitivity scores improved the TNR by 5.0%.
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Table 5.4: Evaluation of Granularity
Granularity
Signatures
SUSI Categories

5.5

TNR(%)
93.4
87.7

TPR (%)
91.4
85.8

Geometric Accuracy (%)
92.4
86.7

Using Varying levels of granualrity

Next, we use SUSI categories to represent dataflows. Despite being a more coarsegrained approach, using SUSI categories performed well and received a geometric
accuracy of 86.7%.

5.6

Limitations

There are several limitations with pDroid. As with other static analysis systems [26,
39, 40] on Android, pDroid cannot detect privacy disclosures caused by Java reflection,
code obfuscation, or dynamic code loading. pDroid is also susceptible to the pollution
attack described in [39], where a malicous developer intentially creates many malicous
applications with similar textual descriptions, causing pDroid to create a “malicous
cluster” where malcious dataflows are common and therefore will go undetected. A
simple solution to this issue would be to only compare applications that are developed
by different developers. However, this could be easily by passed by registering the
malicious applications under different names.

50

Chapter 6
Conclusions
This chapter concludes this Master Thesis by discussing the Future Work and
Conclusion. Section 6.1 discusses the future work and potential improvements that
could be made to pDroid. Section Section 6.2

6.1

Future Work

Many frameworks can detect malware, but pDroid unique method of comparing most
similar applications should allow it to be a successful tool in identifying ”grayware”
applications. These type of applications generally are not considered malicious but
are not being fully transparent about the application’s full ability. In future work,
we plan on adapting pDroid to focus on detecting grayware instead of only malware.
Additionally, we want to use pDroid to provide security reports to end users, who
can use them to interpret the potential security risks of an application.
While pDroid was able to detect malware at a high rate, there is room for
improvement.

First, we only consider the textual description to be the alleged

behavior of an application. However, the amount of downloads, size, and recommend
app’s, and could provide more insight on the application’s behavior. Next, pDroid
currently assumes that advertising frameworks should be trusted and does not take
into consideration the dataflows within them. However, they are most likely leaking
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sensitive data about the end user. This type of behavior should be stated in the
textual description. pDroid uses the amount of dataflows found within an application
to assist in classifying an app as benign or malicious. A malicous application could
easily trick pDroid by adding an excessive amount of benign dataflows into their
application, which would cause pDroid to misclassify it. Therefore, a new technique
for comparing applications of similar sizes needs to be developed.

6.2

Conclusion

In this master thesis we presented pDroid, a framework for comparing the textual
description of an application to the internal dataflows of an application. Unlike
previous approaches, pDroid uses a more fine-grained approach to capture an
application’s actual behavior. pDroid correctly identified 91.4% of malware with
a false positive rate of 4.9%.
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